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COMMENT
Storm Over Red Rim: Private Property Rights
Collide With The Unlawful Inclosures Act.
Winter came hard to southern Wyoming in late November of 1983.
Soon thereafter, the national and local news media were calling attention
to the plight of a large antelope herd in an area south of Rawlins, Wyoming known as Red Rim. A fence blocked the animals' migration to their
winter range, the only area where forage was readily available. Many
animals were dying of starvation compounded by the extremely harsh
weather conditions.1
The public outcry was deafening. The controversy involved a fence
which inclosed an area of checkerboard land.2 Mr. Taylor Lawrence had
erected the fence, and he owned or leased slightly more than half of the
land within. Although the fence was located almost entirely on private
land owned by Mr. Lawrence, almost half of the area inside of the fence
was public land.
In response to the public outcry, the Governor of Wyoming arranged
a meeting between Mr. Lawrence and the Wyoming Game and Fish
Department. An agreement was reached allowing the Department to lower
portions of the fence during the winter and to rebuild the fence the following spring.4 The next winter (1984-85) a similar agreement was reached.
The fence was lowered in the fall and raised again the next spring.' The
agreements had been negotiated one at a time and no permanent agreement was ever concluded by the parties. The lack of a permanent agreement precipitated a lawsuit. 6
The United States brought the action alleging that Mr. Lawrence
violated the Unlawful Inclosures Act.' The suit was filed in United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming. The Wyoming Wildlife Federation and the National Wildlife Federation then became parties to the suit
as plaintiff intervenors.8 Plaintiffs asked the court to declare the fence
1. KTWO Television, Casper, Wyoming, (Nov. 29, 1983) showed the first account in
the electronic media. NBC Nightly News (Dec. 6, 1983) also showed footage of starving
antelope.
2. It was the custom of Congress to grant land to railroads in alternating one square
mile sections. The resulting surface ownership pattern appears as a checkerboard when viewed
on a map. For a more detailed explanation of the checkerboard land grants and the rationale
behind them, see Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 669-78 (1979).
3. Complaint of United States at Exhibit 1, United States v. Lawrence, No. C85-0136
(D. Wyo. filed April 11, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Complaint].
4. Answer of Defendant, Taylor Lawrence at 4, United States v. Lawrence, No.
C85-0136 (D. Wyo. filed May 6, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Answer].
5. Id
6. United States v. Lawrence, No. C85-0136 (D. Wyo. complaint filed April 11, 1985).
7. Complaint, supra note 3, at 3. The Unlawful Inclosures of Public Lands Act, 43
U.S.C.A. §§ 1061-1066 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Unlawful Inclosures
Act].
8. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 1062 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985) (the act specifies that the United
States attorney has the duty to prosecute violations of the Unlawful Inclosures Act when
a citizen files an affidavit with him alleging a violation of the act).
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unlawful and sought a mandatory injunction compelling the removal or
modification of the fence to allow free and unobstructed access of pronghorn antelope to the public land within the fence.9
After a full hearing on the merits, the intervenors were awarded injunctive relief on October 21, 1985.'0 The district court ordered Mr.
Lawrence to remove the fence or modify it so that antelope can pass
through it." District court Judge Brimmer issued a bench order based
on findings that the defendant had unlawfully inclosed public lands, that
the defendant was in violation of the Unlawful Inclosures Act, and that
the fence was a nuisance which would cause irreparable harm if not abated.
This comment will discuss the legal issues that were in controversy
in the trial of the Red Rim case. 2 These legal issues, which may be reviewed upon appeal, are:
(1) Whether the Unlawful Inclosures Act prohibits the exclusion
of antelope from the public domain.
(2) Whether a fence may be erected around private property to
protect private interests even if public land is inclosed by the fence.
(3) Whether grazing rights granted by Section 3 of the Taylor
Grazing Act exempt a party from the Unlawful Inclosures Act.
(4) Whether the goverment is estopped from prosecuting the
owner of the fence for unlawfully inclosing public land.
BACKGROUND

One hundred years ago, Congress enacted "An Act to Prevent the
Unlawful Occupancy of the Public Lands."'' 3 Today this act is known as
the Unlawful Inclosures Act (UIA).' 4 The act makes it unlawful for a party to erect or maintain an inclosure around or to assert the exclusive use
of any public land unless the party has good faith claim or color of title
to the property under the public land laws of the United States. 5
When the UIA was passed in 1885, the policy of Congress was to
dispose of the vacant public lands. That objective was promoted through
legislation.', Congress also allowed free grazing on the open range of the
public domain. This was the custom of the day in 1885, and Congress sanc9. Complaint, supra note 3, at 3.

10. Telephone interview with counsel for'intervenors at National Wildlife Federation,
Rocky Mountain Natural Resources Clinic, Boulder, Colorado (Oct. 23, 1985).
11. Casper Star-Tribune, October 22, 1985, at 1.
12. Answer, supra note 4. The issues chosen for discussion are the defenses asserted
in defendant's answer.
13. Ch. 149, 23 Stat. 321 (1885).
14. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 684 (1979).
15. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1061 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985).
16. See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1890) (discussion of the laws of the United
States relating to public lands). The court noted that title to public land could easily be obtained for a very low price.
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tioned it by acquiescence. 7 The United States Supreme Court acknowledged and endorsed this custom in 1889.18
Conflicts over the public domain arose against this background. The
first users on much of the land were graziers. Conflicts surfaced when these
"cattle barons" started fencing the public lands for their own uses. 9
Because the fencing out of settlers conflicted with the national policy of
settling the West, the UIA was passed to give potential settlers a legal
remedy for being excluded from the public domain. 0 The government had
a duty to prosecute those who were monopolizing the range, and it did
so on many occasions. Yet conflicts continued as long as graziers and settlers were competing for the public domain.2'
The Taylor Grazing Act,2 passed in 1934, ended most of these disputes
over vacant public lands. It accomplished this in two ways. First, public
lands were withdrawn from entry to homesteaders.2 3 This eliminated the
competition for public lands between settlers and graziers. Secondly, the
act changed the grazing on public land from a commons to a permit system
regulated by the government. Those who were grazing stock in 1934 were
given a preference right to use the public lands to the exclusion of others.24
This eliminated the competition for public grazing land among the graziers.
The first United States Supreme Court opinion defining the public's
right to access to public lands was Buford v. Houtz.25 Plaintiffs in that
case were cattle graziers who owned about one-third of the lands in a
checkerboard area. They were seeking to enjoin sheep-raisers from bringing their herds onto the area. The Supreme Court saw no equity in barring the sheepmen from the public land located within the checkerboard.
The denial of an injunction was upheld. 26 The decision was based upon
the Supreme Court's conclusion that there was an implied license to graze
livestock on the public lands. This license, the court reasoned, grew out
of the one-hundred year old custom of grazing public land 2 7 Buford
17. Id
18. Id. at 326. The Court noted: "We are of the opinion that there is an implied license
... that the public lands of the United States ... shall be free to the people who seek to
use them, where they are left open and unenclosed, and no act of the government forbids
this use."
19. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1897).
20. Id
21. There is a long line of reported cases beginning with United States v. Brighton Ranch
Co., 25 F. 465 (1885), that document prosecutions for violations of the Unlawful Inclosures Act.
22. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 315-315r (West 1964 & Supp. 1985) (as amended).
23. The withdrawal of lands from the public domain was not in the Taylor Grazing Act
itself. In order to carry out the purposes of the Act, the President, by an Executive Order
of November 26, 1934, No. 6910 withdrew vacant public land from entry to settlement. See
Red Canyon Sheep v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 311 (1938).
24. The Taylor Grazing Act authorized the formation of grazing districts and authorized
the Secretary of the Interior to issue permits for the grazing district "to such bona fide settlers, residents, and other stock owners as under his rules and regulations are entitled to
participate in the use of the range .. " See § 3, 48 Stat. 1270 (1934); 43 U.S.C.A. § 315b
(West 1964 & Supp. 1985).
25. 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
26. Id at 332.
27. Id at 326.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1986

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 21 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 5

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXI

demonstrates that courts will protect access to facilitate a lawful use of
public lands within a checkerboard area.
DISCUSSION

Are Antelope Protected?
In the Red Rim lawsuit, Taylor Lawrence asserted as a defense that28
the UIA does not prohibit the exclusion of antelope from public land.
The wording of the act seemingly supports this assertion. Section 3 of
the Unlawful Inclosures Act states in part: "No person... shall prevent
or obstruct ...any person from peaceably entering upon ...any tract

of public land ...or shall prevent or obstruct free passage or transit over
or through the public lands .... "29 At first glance, this seems to suggest
that the UIA prohibits only the exclusion of persons from public land.
A study of the case law, however, indicates that courts have applied a
broad meaning to the term "any person" in order to protect public
interests.
The case of Stoddard v. United States30 clearly illustrates how courts
broadly interpreted the term "any person." In Stoddard, the defendant
was convicted of violating the UIA by fencing livestock off of public land.
On appeal he maintained that the UIA did not forbid the obstruction of
free passage or transit of livestock over or through the public lands. The
federal circuit court of appeals responded by stating:
The act, in our opinion, was intended to prevent the obstruction
of free passage or transit for any and all lawful purposes over
public lands. It is a well-known fact that the free herding and grazing of cattle on the public lands is a legitimate use to which they
may be put, and we think Congress must have had the preservation and protection of this use in mind in the enactment under
consideration.

3

1

This holding, while defining what interests will be protected by the
UIA, demonstrates that congressional intent is the touchstone for that
determination. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States32 illustrates that modern
courts also look at congressional policy in determining the reach of a public
land law. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, concluded that Congress did not intend that the UIA give the government
the authority to impose a public right-of-way across private property
without compensation. He noted that at the time the UIA was passed,
the norm was open range, open to settlement and free grazing.3 3 He reasoned that the incidental intrusion of settlers and livestock was the only
28. Answer, supra note 4, at 8-9.
29. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1063 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985)(emphasis added).
30. 214 F. 566 (8th Cir. 1914).
31. Id at 568-69 (emphasis added).
32. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
33. Id. at 685.
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imposition upon private property that Congress intended under the UIA.3 '
Even though Leo Sheep Co. considered an intrusion upon private property, the analysis proceeded from the same basis as Stoddard.Both courts
looked to congressional intent to determine the scope of the Unlawful Inclosures Act.
The obvious argument would be that Congress, in 1885, did not intend to protect against exclusion of antelope from public lands. The policy
in 1885 was to promote the exploitation of natural resources, including
wild animals, found on the public lands. 5 But it can be argued more persuasively that Congress has recently brought antelope and other wild
animals under the protection of the UIA.
36
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)
is persuasive evidence that antelope are protected by the UIA. FLPMA
was a comprehensive revision of all public land laws. It officially established the modern policy of retaining the public lands in government
ownership and mandated that they be affirmatively managed under
multiple-use principles. 31 FLPMA repealed some of the public land laws,"'
amended others.3 9 and left many essentially intact. 0 It did not alter or
amend the Unlawful Inclosures Act. 41 Instead, the UIA was left in place.
Congress apparently believed that the UIA was an appropriate tool for
affirmative multiple-use management of the public lands mandated by
FLPMA.
Antelope must be a natural resource that Congress intended to protect under FLPMA. To exclude them would render the UIA meaningless.
There are no longer homesteaders to protect nor are there graziers with
unregulated legal access to the open range. Congress must have intended
to protect natural resources such as antelope when it left the UIA
untouched. 2
34. See id&at 684-88. The Court seemed to be basing its holding on an intrusion analysis.
The intrusion analysis comes from "taking" cases. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979). Under this test, when a government agency imposes a right-of-way
across fee land, it is considered a physical invasion that constitutes a taking, whereby the
government must compensate the landowner. In Leo Sheep, Justice Rehnquist apparently
saw the government's actions in the case as a taking. His discussion, however, implies that
the incidental passage of settlors and livestock over private land was an "incursion" imposed by the UIA which was not substantial enough to be considered a taking. The "incursion" of antelope on private property may be subject to this intrusion test on appeal.
35. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1890).
36. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1784 (West Supp. 1985).
37. Id § 1701(a)(7).
38. See P.L. 94-579, Title VII, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787 (1976) (FLPMA repealed the
homesteading laws).
39. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1751-1753 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985) (FLPMA amended the
Taylor Grazing Act).
40. See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 21-50 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985); 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1712, 1714,
1732 (West Supp. 1985) (the Mining Law of 1872 was virtually unchanged by FLPMA).
41. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1061-1066 (West Supp. 1985) where it is shown that the Unlawful
Inclosures Act was not modified by FLPMA. Section 1062 was amended by Congress in
1984. The 1984 amendment changed a procedural provision of the act. Otherwise, the UIA
is substantially the same today as when it was passed one hundred years ago.
42. Id
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Antelope should certainly fall under the protection of the UIA under
the intrusion test used in Leo Sheep Co. Antelope are no more of an intrusion on private property than cattle or sheep were when settlers were
homesteading the public domain. It would be difficult to argue that wild
animals are more intrusive upon private property than bands of sheep
were in the days of unlimited open grazing on public land. Further, Congress was certainly aware that antelope would sometimes intrude upon
private lands when it refused to repeal the Unlawful Inclosures Act.
The government should prevail on the issue of whether antelope are
protected by the UIA. Precedent demonstrates that courts will apply a
broad meaning to the term "any person" to protect public interests. Congressional intent is also on the side of the government. FLPMA clearly
indicates that Congress wants natural resources such as antelope protected on public land.
Can a Landowner Fence His Own Land?
The fence at issue in the Red Rim case is approximately twenty-eight
miles long. It borders about seven miles of public land along the perimeter
of the area it incloses. None of the fence is located on public lands.43 Mr.
Lawrence asserts that the UIA neither prevents nor limits the fencing
owns or controls by lease. The case law, however, is to
of the lands he
4
the contrary. "
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Camfield
v. United States. 45 The defendants erected a fence around two townships
of checkerboard land. 4 No portion of the fence was located on public land.
Upon prosecution for violating the UIA, the defendants asserted that it
was unconstitutional for the government to enjoin fences located on
private property. The Court found that the fence interfered with legitimate
uses of public land and ruled that it was an appropriate use of police power
to abate the erection of fences on private lands through the
for Congress
7
UIA.4
This rule, however, does not resolve the controversy. Mr. Lawrence
also contends that he has the right to protect grass seedings on his private
property. 8 The Court in Camfield conceded that a landowner has the right
to protect interests on private property with fences. The holding in Camfield was qualified with this statement:
So long as the individual proprietor confines his enclosure to his
own land, the Government has no right to complain, since he is
entitled to the complete and exclusive enjoyment of it, regardless
of any detriment to his neighbor; but when, under the guise of
43. Answer, supra note 4, at 2-3. Defendant agreed to move a short section of fence
located on public land to private land.
44. See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
45. Id
46. Two townships cover approximately forty-six thousand acres.
47. Camfield, 167 U.S. at 525-26.
48. Answer, supra note 4, at 3.
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enclosing his own land, he builds a fence which is useless for that
purpose, and can only have been intended to enclose the lands of
the Government, he is plainly within the statute, and is guilty of
appropriation of that which belongs to the public
an unwarrantable
49
at large.

This statement caused much confusion in the lower courts. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently held that the government must
prove intent to inclose public lands to successfully prosecute a party for
violating the UIA.5 ° The ninth circuit based this holding on the reasoning in Camfield. Yet the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that intent
was irrelevant; if public land was in fact inclosed, the UIA had been
violated."
The conflict between the circuit courts was understandable. The
Supreme Court in Camfield plainly indicated that a party's intent is relevant in determining whether that party is in violation of the UIA. On the
other hand, the Court was affirming a lower court's decree which expressly
stated that intent was not open to judicial inquiry.5" The better view is
that intent is relevant in determining a violation of the UIA because of
the landowner's right to protect his private property interests with fences.
Prosecutions under the UIA are suits brought in equity, and a court must
necessarily weigh private property rights against the public interests at
risk.53
In Leo Sheep Co. v. United States" the Court also spoke of a landowners right to fence his property. Justice Rehnquist found that, if all
the landowners in a checkerboard area fenced their private land, access
to public land would be obstructed. As Justice Rehnquist explained:
In fact, the Court [in Camfield] affirmed the grantee's right to fence
completely his own land ....

Obviously, if [the privately owned

sections] are individually fenced, the access to [the government
owned sections] is obstructed. Yet the Camfield Court found that
this was not a violation of the Unlawful Inclosures Act.55
This statement demonstrates that landowners have a right to protect
their own property with fences. It also shows, however, that they must
have a legitimate interest to protect when they do so. Justice Rehnquist
pointed out that when a checkerboard area was developed or settled, landowners would necessarily need to protect their private property. He
qualified his statement by noting that when development occurs, it occurs in a parallel fashion on the adjoining public land. He reasoned that
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Camfield, 167 U.S. at 528.
Golconda Cattle Co. v. United States, 214 F. 903, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1914).
Homer v. United States, 185 F. 741, 745-46 (8th Cir. 1911).
1& at 746.
Cameron v. United States, 148 U.S. 301, 304 (1893).
440 U.S. 668 (1979).
Id. at 685-86.
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social and commercial intercourse would create access roads so that access would no longer be an issue.5"
This discussion in Leo Sheep Co. does not fit the fact pattern of the
Red Rim case. The Red Rim area is still open range unserved by public
access roads.5 7 Leo Sheep Co. does affirm Mr. Lawrence's right to protect
his private property, but it does not allow him to ignore public interests
on the public lands affected by his actions.
The defense of protecting private property interest in the Red Rim
case raises the issue of Mr. Lawrence's intent. The district court apparently found that Mr. Lawrence proceeded with the intention of inclosing
federal land when he erected the fence at Red Rim. It must have also found
that he had no legitimate interest to protect by doing so.58 Unless the court
committed reversible error in making these findings, the government
should prevail on this issue on appeal. Camfield dictates that a landowner
can inclose public land only if the purpose is to protect a legitimate private
property interest. If the purpose of a fence is solely to inclose public land,
there is a violation of the UIA.5 9
Does a Public Grazing Right Grant an Interest in Public Land?
The UIA exempts those who occupy public land under color of title.06
In the Red Rim case, the defense asserted that federal grazing rights on
the inclosed lands at Red Rim grant Mr. Lawrence a leasehold color of
title to the lands."' If this assertion is correct as a matter of law, he is
exempt from prosecution under the UIA, and the district court may be
reversed.
Mr. Lawrence possesses a federal grazing permit on the public lands
in the Red Rim area. This permit was granted under Section 3 of the Taylor
Grazing Act.6 The question before the court will be whether an interest

in the public land attaches with the issuance of the federal grazing permit. If the court finds such an interest, the grazier can escape prosecution for violating the UIA.
First, it is necessary to examine why Congress included the claim of
right exemption in the UIA. Homesteading was the custom when the UIA
was passed. To gain patent to a parcel of land under the homestead laws
it was necessary to occupy that parcel for a requisite period of time. 3 An
exemption to the UIA was included so that settlers could legally occupy
56. Id at 686.
57. Answer, supra note 4, at 9.
58. See Casper-Star Tribune, Oct. 22, 1985, at 1. Judge Brimmer asked defendant's
counsel if the real purpose of the fence was to prevent a governmental determination that

the Red Rim area was unsuitable for coal mining because it was antelope winter range.

59. 167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897).
60. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1061 (West 1984 & Supp. 1985).
61. Answer, supra note 4, at 6.
62. Telephone interview with BLM personnel from Rawlins District (Sept. 20, 1985).
63. See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 161-164 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985) (repealed in lower forty-eight
states by FLPMA in 1976)
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their homesteads and inclose them with fences. The color of title granted
by the homestead law made the occupancy of public lands lawful if the
purpose was to homestead. 64 An exception also applied to those occupying lands for the purpose of satisfying mining claims. 65
There are no reported case concerning public grazing rights and prosecution under the UIA. There are cases, however, that define the scope
of grazing rights granted under Section 3 of the Taylor Grazing Act. 66
The first case defining the scope of a Section 3 grazing right was Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes.67 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that, if a livestock operator qualified under the regulations
promulgated under the Taylor Grazing Act, he was in a preferred class
and was entitled as of right to grazing permits as against others who did
not qualify.68 Subsequent courts narrowed this rule through further
6 9
qualifications.

This narrowing is illustrated by the case of McNeil v. Seaton.70 The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia followed the rule from Red
Canyon Sheep Co. but with the qualification that, "[i]t is clear that a permittee as against the United States may acquire no 'right, title, interest,
or estate in or to the lands' as section 3 provides, and the Government
for its own use may without payment of compensation withdraw the permit privilege." 71 This ruling established that a livestock grazier's permit
was not protected as of right from7 the
government but was still protected
2
as of right against other parties.
The nature of the right acquired by a homesteader who had occupied
public land under a color of title clearly differs from the right one acquires
under the Taylor Grazing Act. A settler in 1885 could occupy public land
for the purpose of securing patent to the land occupied. This lawful occupation conferred color of title to the potential patentee. In contrast, the
Taylor Grazing Act merely allows the permittee of such a right to graze
public lands lawfully. The Taylor Grazing Act itself expressly states that
3
a permittee acquires no "right, title, interest or estate in or to the land."1
The case law confirms that a grazing permittee of public land possesses
no claim to title of the land. 74 No court has ever held that a Section 3 grazing permit grants a leasehold interest in the land. Mr. Lawrence has only
a slim chance of prevailing on this issue in the Red Rim case.
64. See 43 U.S.C.A. § 161 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985).
65. See 30 U.S.C.A. § 26 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985).
66. See Ragsdale, Section 3 Rights Under the Taylor Grazing Act, 4 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 399 (1969) for a thorough treatment of grazing rights granted by Section 3 of the
Taylor Grazing Act.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

98 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
Id at 314.
Ragsdale, supra note 66, at 408.
281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Id. at 934.
See Ragsdale, supra note 66, at 420-22.
43 U.S.C.A. § 315b (West 1964 & Supp. 1985).
McNeil v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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Can the Government be Estopped?
In the Red Rim case Mr. Lawrence asserts that agents of the government approved the building of the disputed fence. 7 That allegation, if true,
raises the issue of whether the government may be estopped from enjoining the fence. Unfortunately for the defendant, it is very difficult to assert
estoppel against the government successfully. The basic rule, as set forth
by the Supreme Court in Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States,7 6 is
that "the United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do...
what the law does not sanction or permit."" The policy behind this rule

is that when the interests of the public are at stake, the government should
not be estopped on principles of equity despite any statements or conduct of government agents.7 Therefore, courts generally insure that
agents of
the government do not waive or revise laws through improper
79
actions.
The harshness of the rule barring estoppel has been tempered in some
situations. In determining whether to allow an assertion of estoppel
against the government, courts often distinguish between the government's sovereign capacity and its proprietary capacity. 0 Courts are much
less reluctant to estop the government when it is acting in a proprietary
capacity.8 ' This is because public interests are usually not at risk in proprietary transactions.
Although courts are also reluctant to estop the government when it
is performing a sovereign function, in some situations the estoppel defense
will be allowed. In United States v. Lazy FCRanch,8 the government sued
to recover payments improperly made under the Soil Bank Act. The defendants had relied on misrepresentations made by government agents. The
court held that the government was estopped in the interest of justice
and fair play. 3 It is important to note, however, the court's finding that
the government received the full benefit of the contract it made with the
defendants.8 4 Thus, estoppel will be allowed against the government if
justice and fair play will be served, but only if the underlying government
policies will not be undermined.
The government has been held estopped in two cases in which interests
in public land were in dispute. In Brandt v. Hicke 8' the Department of
Interior had voided a competitive lease bid application for non-compliance
with formal regulatory requirements. The government was held estopped
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Answer, supra note 4, at 7-8.
243 U.S. 389 (1916).
Id at 409.
Id
United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694, 702 (10th Cir. 1980).
Annot., 27 A.L.R. FED. 702, 709-12 (1976).
Id at 722-24.
481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973).
Id at 988-90.
Id. at 90.
427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970).
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from denying the application after it was determined that the applicant
8
had relied on erroneous information given by a government employee. "
7 the government was estopped from
In Oil Shale Corporationv. Morton,"
denying a patent application. In attempting to perfect the patent, the
claimants had acted for over thirty years in reliance on government
policies 8 The court reasoned that it was merely holding the government
89
to its word, not sanctioning illegal conduct by the defendants. Both of
these cases arose in situations in which a claimant's interests were being
challenged for failure to follow administrative rules when the claimants
had relied on the action or words of the government. This is distinguishable
from the situation in which a party is in direct violation of a statute designed to protect public interest.
If a court determines that the UIA forbids the exclusion of antelope
from public lands, it follows that the court believes antelope are a public
resource protected by the government. In this context, it would be difficult to assert estoppel successfully against the government. First, it is
almost impossible to prevail against the government when it acts in its
sovereign capacity. Second, as stated in Utah Power & Light Co. v. United
States, the government will not be estopped to permit conduct not sanctioned by law. 0
It is unlikely that an appeal court will overturn the district court in
the Red Rim case on this issue. If antelope are a public interest, the government is acting in its sovereign capacity in protecting them. This makes
it very difficult for a private party to assert estoppel. And, if estoppel
would permit Mr. Lawrence to violate the UIA, no court is going to allow
the estoppel defense.
CONCLUSION

The government stands in a good position to prevail in the Red Rim
case on appeal. It must first be accepted as a matter of law that pronghorn
antelope come within the protection of the Unlawful Inclosures Act. The
Federal Land Policy and Management Act supports this conclusion.
FLPMA is convincing evidence of Congress' intent to protect antelope
on public land.
The most difficult issue for the government is whether the erection
of fences on private property can be abated. The language in Leo Sheep
Co. indicates that a private landowner has the right to fence his own property. But that language must be read in the context in which it was made.
The Supreme Court was affirming Camfield when it spoke of this property owner's right. Camfield clearly states that public land cannot be inclosed without a valid purpose. The district court did not find such a purpose. The government's position is strong but not infallible on this issue.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id at 56-57.
370 F. Supp. 108 (D. Colo. 1973).
Id at 124.
Id at 126.
243 U.S. 389, 409 (1916).
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The government must also convince the appellate court that federal
grazing rights confer no interest in public land to the holders of those
rights. The government stands on a firm legal basis on this issue because
the Taylor Grazing Act expressly withdraws any interest in the land attached to a grazing right. In addition, no court has ever recognized that
an interest in public grazing land arises by virtue of Section 3 of the Taylor
Grazing Act.
The appellate court will not need to address the estoppel issue in order
to reverse the district court. If the district court erred in finding a violation of the UIA, it will be reversed on those grounds. If the district court
correctly found a violation, it will not be reversed on the estoppel issue.
The rule is that the government will not be estopped when acting in its
sovereign capacity, if the estoppel would permit unlawful conduct.
MICHAEL
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